The position adopted by the courts in the administrative case represented by HGNS Counselor Law Firm once again reveals a deeply concerning tendency in administrative justice: the transformation of the concept of admissibility of a claim into an instrument of excessive formalism, ultimately undermining the very essence of judicial protection.
As is known, the courts of first instance and appeal refused to consider the claim admissible, and by its ruling dated 20 November 2025, the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan declined to admit the cassation appeal for consideration. The refusal was primarily justified by references to the alleged absence of a “subjective right” on the part of the claimant and the existence of an allegedly “established and uniform judicial practice”.
Such reasoning, however, is fundamentally incompatible with the principles governing administrative judicial review.
The issue of fault concerns the merits, not admissibility
It is of particular importance that neither the Investigation Act prepared by the competent labour inspection authority, nor the corresponding IZ-form act, established any fault on the part of the claimant company or its Chief Executive Officer in connection with the workplace accident. Furthermore, no administrative liability proceedings were initiated against the claimant or its management under Article 198 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
From a legal perspective, these circumstances are decisive. Whether the employer bears fault for the accident is a question that may only be determined during the substantive examination of the case, following an adversarial hearing and assessment of evidence. It is not, and cannot be, a criterion for assessing the admissibility of a claim. By effectively prejudging this issue at the admissibility stage, the courts blurred the procedural boundary between admissibility and merits—an approach incompatible with basic principles of administrative procedural law.
Avoidance of the proper application of Article 35 of the Administrative Procedural Code
Article 35 of the Administrative Procedural Code sets out a clear and limited test for admissibility: whether the claimant has sufficiently substantiated that an administrative act, action, or omission has infringed its rights or legally protected interests.
In the present case, this threshold was manifestly met:
- the administrative authority refused to pay the statutory benefit;
- as a result of that refusal, the claimant was compelled to make the payment from its own funds;
- consequently, the claimant suffered a real, quantifiable pecuniary loss.
Despite the clear presence of these elements, the courts declined to admit the claim. Such an approach contradicts the very purpose of Article 35, which is designed to open the door to judicial review, not to close it through an unduly restrictive interpretation.
Formal restriction of the right of access to a court
The courts’ approach ultimately resulted in a formal restriction of the claimant’s right of access to a court. Constitutional guarantees and administrative procedural legislation envisage courts as institutions entrusted with resolving legal disputes on their merits, not as bodies that avoid adjudication through procedural barriers detached from the substance of the dispute.
The use of the admissibility doctrine as a filtering mechanism to preclude substantive judicial scrutiny of administrative action (or inaction) poses serious risks to legal certainty and public confidence in the judiciary.
Continuing the legal challenge
For these reasons, HGNS Counselor Law Firm proceeded to file a new statement of claim, this time formulating the demand as a direct claim for reimbursement of the amounts already paid. The objective is clear: to ensure that the dispute is examined on its merits, within the framework of an open and adversarial judicial process, as required by the rule of law.
HGNS Counselor Law Firm remains firmly committed to the principle that administrative justice must not be reduced to procedural formalism. Genuine judicial protection is achieved not through refusal rulings, but through reasoned judgments addressing the substance of legal disputes.